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Introduction
The idea of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
states has been a hallmark of international relations since 
the seventeenth century. The universalisation of the 
nation-state model following decolonisation over the 
twentieth century rendered this ideal of state sovereignty 
the basis of the modem international political system. 
States mostly keep out of each other’s business, but 
intervention may take the form of war to enforce regime 
change.
More often interventions in the form of 
peacekeeping operations can occur if sufficient political 
will exists within the United Nations system or regional 
organisations to end conflict or combat humanitarian 
catastrophes. In this regard failed states are an 
international concern as the breakdown of a state’s 
capacity to control its population and administration may 
have severe implications for its neighbours. Challenges 
to state authority may result in violence, murder, the 
creation of refugee flows, or perhaps increased criminal 
activity through transnational crime groups taking hold.
As a supporter of the ‘coalition of the willing’, 
Australia has played only a bit part in weighty 
international events, but as Paul Kelly (2004) has argued, 
Australia has long held dear the notion that it is ‘Punching 
Above Our Weight’. While an international lightweight 
in military terms, in the Pacific region Australia resembles 
a superpower. For the US, the Pacific is Australia’s 
responsibility (Kerin 2004), and if Australia can’t fix even 
these small island states then what use is it to the Western 
alliance? The trend in the Pacific is now about security 
and arresting ‘state collapse’ before it occurs. The 2003 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) and the Enhanced Cooperation Program 
(ECP) between Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
are part of this new trend. They are both interventions 
— RAMSI at least looked like one— but while the ECP 
has been lumped in with aid, the reality is far more 
intrusive.
Australia and PNG: the political context
The Australia-PNG relationship is complex. Despite the 
asymmetry of power, the contest is rarely one-sided. 
Australia has had a long history of involvement in PNG 
affairs, much of it from a position of formal political
control.1 After almost eighty years of colonial rule Papua 
New Guinea became self-governing in 1973 and 
independent on 16 September 1975. Since then, relations 
between PNG and Australia have been close, but 
sometimes problematic. As the incident involving PNG 
Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare’s forced shoe 
removal at Brisbane Airport in March 2005 (Mathieson 
2005) has shown, the relationship can be testy at times. 
The appearance of how things are done matters as much 
as what is actually done.
While aid after independence initially took the form 
of cash grants, by the late 1980s the economic thinking 
on aid had shifted to the point that conditionality was 
introduced to the aid budget from 1989 onwards. From 
then on, tied aid became the norm as the money stopped 
flowing into the budget but started to support specific 
projects. The tied aid arrangement was thought by both 
sides to be beneficial as it would encourage sustainable 
spending by PNG administrations, but the danger of 
linking aid to Australia’s interests was clear (Fry 1997, 
302) and accusations of neo-colonialism have dogged 
many subsequent Australian initiatives. AusAID’s gradual 
adoption of the ‘whole of government approach’ 
(AusAID 2005, xiii) is tied to Australia’s national security 
as it aims to stabilise neighbouring countries through aid 
programs that concentrate mainly on poverty reduction 
through the promotion of sustainable development
The Pacific is an important part of Australia’s aid 
commitment The 2005 AusAID budget totals almost 
$2.5bn of which $955 million (38%) goes to the Pacific, 
making it the largest portion by region, exceeding the aid 
commitment to SE Asia (including Indonesia), which 
accounts for 26% of all aid funds (AusAID 2005). PNG 
alone receives $492 million of Australian aid. As a 
developing state, PNG certainly has its share of problems 
and there are few if any in PNG who would argue that 
they do not need the assistance.
Despite occasional differences of opinion, 
Australia has been the only country on whom PNG can 
rely, and it has done so consistently since independence. 
Traditionally Australia has supplied around one third of 
PNG’s budgetary spending (PNG Budget 2003,10). For 
PNG in particular, the point of the aid program is to avoid 
this ‘fragile state’ (AusAID 2005, 22) becoming a 
collapsed state. The ‘whole of government’ approach
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thus incorporates Australian aid money tied to a variety 
of public sector programs: governance 30%; transport 
and infrastructure 17%; health, including programs to 
arrest the spread of HIV/AIDS 17%; education 14%; 
and now the extra money for salaries to the personnel 
required for the ECP 16% (ibid).
The ECP and the whole-of-govemment approach 
have emerged following the failure of the wider neo­
liberal agenda, and its obsession with 
smaller administration and a reduced role 
for the state. Even the celebrated neo- 
liberal, Francis Fukuyama (2004,24-28), 
has now observed the new conventional 
wisdom is that strong state institutions 
and the rule of law are more important 
than the scope of the state’s activities.
The failure of ‘Washington consensus’ 
policies to deliver smaller but more 
efficient government administration has 
led to a reappraisal of how aid can be 
used and for what purposes. Assistance 
has become a byword for intervention in sovereign states.
PNG’s problems are partly financial. Throughout 
the 1990s, PNG experienced significant economic 
problems as a result of falling commodity prices for its 
major exports of copper, gold, petroleum, silver, forest 
products, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, copra, coconut oil, tea, 
rubber (Costello in IMF, 2001, 2-3). This led to a 
diminished capacity to pay its own way and a consequent 
reduction in the scope and quality of state services. Regan 
and May (2000,169) described the perception amongst 
Papua New Guineans that Australia had too much 
influence over PNG’s government, but also observed the 
popular feeling that the diminishing capacity of the PNG 
state in the delivery of services made the prospects of 
further Australian assistance even more likely. Australia 
supports PNG’s drive for the reduced debt to GDP ratio, 
public sector ‘rightsizing’ programs and a dynamic public 
sector of the agreed Medium Term Development 
Strategy 2005-10 (PNG Budget 2005,9-19) with its own 
Sub National Initiative that aims to support service 
delivery in the provinces (AusAID 2005,28).
This renewed focus on strengthening institutions 
(‘nation building’) is a corollary of the focus on security 
following the attacks on the US of 11 September 2001. 
During 2003, a number of Australian reports drew 
attention to the problems of PNG governance and to the 
possibility of PNG becoming a ‘failed state’. Helen 
Hughes (2003, 1-2) argued that aid to the Pacific had to 
come with conditionality, mutual obligation and key 
performance indicators. Susan Windybank and Mike 
Manning’s (2003) report Papua New Guinea on the 
Brink urged a more interventionist stance in PNG in the 
interest of Australian security.
Both drew attention to the failure of the state to
provide law and order, how this could lead to large scale 
refugee flows and the possibility of transnational criqje 
taking hold. Such reports perhaps either influenced or 
reinforced government thinking and the Enhanced 
Cooperation Program emerged publicly shortly after mid 
2003 as an attempt to exert greater control over PNG 
Following the initial success of RAMSI, a more muscular 
approach was developed for the long-standing problem 
o f how to make PNG work more 
efficiently. PNG is, however, a much 
larger, more populous and a more difficult 
country to ‘ fix’ than the Solomon Islands. 
If the situation in PNG really is as bad as 
the Howard government believes, the 
ECP appears to be a very small band-aid 
for a very big problem.
The Enhanced Cooperation 
Program
Australia announced the new conditions 
in giving aid to PNG in September of2003. 
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer hailed 
the agreement to place, at that time, two hundred federal 
police and other advisers into PNG public service ‘to 
eradicate the misuse of funds, audit finances, and promote 
the efficient delivery of critical services such as health 
and education’ as a ‘new era’ o f Australia-PNG 
relations.3 PNG’s initial acceptance was achieved with 
a stick —agreement came after Downer threatened to 
cut some of the $330 million per annum in programme 
aid (Allard 2003).
Finally, on 11 December 2003 the governments of 
Australia and Papua New Guinea agreed that the 
Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP)3 would go ahead 
with the aims of increasing the capacity of the PNG 
state to develop ‘good governance’. In February 2004, 
the first of up to 230 Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
officers and 64 other officials were deployed (DFAT 
2004a). The problem with the ECP is not assistance from 
Australia perse, but the manner in which the new policy 
was so aggressively pursued. It has been consistently 
touted as a ‘partnership’4 but the reality is the ECP, like 
the non-alcoholic party drink of the 1970s, constitutes 
‘the intervention you have when you’re not having an 
intervention’.
There is a long history of Australia providing 
technical assistance to the PNG public service in a wide 
range of matters, and it is no real surprise that just under 
one quarter o f the people funded by the ECP are 
bureaucrats working in policy, advisory and legal 
positions. The 64 ‘officials’ were to be deployed in a 
variety of departments, mostly in the areas of legal affairs 
in non-policing roles (18 positions), finance (36 positions) 
and migration and aviation (10 positions) (DFAT 2004a). 
Legal officers were to be based in Port Moresby,
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including the position of Solicitor General, and three others 
working in the Solicitor General’s Office. There would 
be five officers in the Prosecutor’s Office working as 
litigation lawyers, two legal officers with correctional 
services and four judges appointed to the national and 
Supreme Courts (ibid). By May 2005, only 43 Australian 
public servants had taken up positions with eight going 
to law and justice, 10 to border control and transport and 
25 to economic and public sector administration agencies 
(AusAID 2005, 27). These officials are not only 
‘advisers’. The Department of Finance covers economic 
advice as well as planning and spending. Treasury was 
to receive at least four Australian officials to work on a 
range of issues including policy advice, policy reform, 
investments, asset sales, wages, aid, commodity 
stabilization, the Structural Adjustment Package and 
taxation policy. Department of Finance would house an 
official to monitor expenditure control while the 
Department of Personnel management would receive 
policy advice. Customs would get some assistance with 
capacity building.
The Department o f Planning and Rural 
Development would receive an officer who would be 
the Joint Head of the Secretariat and oversee revisions 
to the Development Cooperation Treaty that forms the 
basis of the bilateral aid relationship. There would be 
four officials deployed to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and immigration to work on immigration issues 
and two officials to give assistance to PNG’s aviation 
authorities (DFAT 2005a). These officers are there to 
sharpen up the PNG public service, to get it organised 
and efficient so it acts more swiftly to respond to 
Australia’s understanding of PNG’s needs. .
According to DFAT4 Australian officials will help 
PNG’s economic management by improving budget 
formulation and fiscal discipline; assisting with economic 
policy; establishing better performance management in 
the public sector; and addressing problems in the public 
service payroll’ (ibid). PNG returned its 
first surplus budget in three years in 2005, 
due in no small measure to the increased 
surveillance over budgetary processes 
(DFAT 2004b). Call it intervention or call 
it aid, the result is the same.
While public sector activity is one 
part of the ECP, the main focus is law and 
order. Respect for the authority of the state is seen to be 
the basis of civil society, as this apparently encourages 
freedom and commerce. Around 230 Australian Federal 
Police and other state police were to be stationed in a 
variety of locations, principally in what are regarded as 
‘trouble spots’: Port Moresby, Bougainville, Lae, Mt 
Hagen, and along the Highlands Highway that links Lae 
to Mt Hagen.
Their functions would include providing advice on
equipment, planning, training and operations but they 
would also be ‘in-line’, working alongside the Royal PNG 
Constabulary. Australian concerns about corruption and 
a general crisis of law, order and governance prompted 
the introduction of police in both managerial and actual 
policing roles. Again, the ‘thin blue line’ (White 2003) 
seems a curious response to what has been sold as 
possible ‘state collapse’ in PNG The conditions governing 
police deployment have now perhaps caused the entire 
deal to unravel.
Immunity and sovereignty 
PNG is a sovereign state, and sovereign states do not 
normally require foreign armed troops to help them control 
their own country. PNG accepted the ECP as it had little 
choice, but negotiations dragged through to June 2004 
due to hostility to the notion of sovereign immunity for 
Australian personnel. A compromise emerged in June 
2004 with ‘broad agreement on a revised draft’ and a 
proposal to establish ‘a joint consultative committee to 
consider cases where immunity may need to apply’ (ABC 
News 2004).
In July 2004, the PNG Parliament passed the ECP Act 
enabling the operation to go ahead and providing Assisting 
Australian Police with immunity. The Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations 1961 provides for immunity from 
prosecution for representatives of foreign states on 
authorised business, and the principle has also been 
extended to peacekeeping forces to avoid petty or 
vexatious litigation that detract from the tasks at hand.
Sovereign immunity does not mean blanket 
immunity from prosecution— troops and other officials 
are still accountable under the jurisdictions of their own 
states for criminal acts. Immunity for ECP personnel 
has proved to be a vexed issue. Article 8 of die agreement 
of 30 June 2004 tried to set up a system where Australia 
and PNG had concurrent jurisdiction for offences 
committed in PNG punishable under PNG law, and 
exclusive Australian jurisdiction for matters 
recognised as crimes in Australia but not 
in PNG In cases where an act was a crime 
in PNG but not in Australia the Joint 
Steering Committee created to monitor the 
entire ECP would decide which state would 
have jurisdiction for the alleged offence 
(Australian Treaty Series 2004).
At the time of writing, 115 of the Australian Federal 
and State police personnel deployed to Port Moresby 
and Bougainville5 had been withdrawn following the 13 
May 2005 PNG Supreme Court ruling on certain 
provisions of the ECP agreement and the enabling Act 
(DFAT 2005b; AAP 2005). The panel of judges chaired 
by the Chief Justice® unanimously found that sections of 
the ECP agreement dealing with the sovereign immunity 
of deployed personnel were inconsistent with the PNG
...call it 
intervention or call 
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constitution (Post Courier 2005a). The decision does 
not mean the entire ECP has to be scrapped, but it does 
mean that at the moment Assisting Australian Police 
cannot enjoy immunity.
The PNG Supreme Court has ruled that the Joint 
Steering Committee would interfere with the prosecutorial 
powers of the Royal Papua New Guinea constabulary, 
which are held to be sacrosanct by the country’s 
Constitution, as well as with the office o f the Public 
Prosecutor. According to John Nonggorr (2005), who 
represented the PNG State in this case, the Supreme 
Court also ruled that ECP personnel could not insist on 
immunity from claims concerning breaches of 
constitutional rights and freedoms, and this is a matter 
that effects not only the ECP deployment but potentially 
all visiting diplomatic personnel.
The Australian government wants the police to 
return as soon as the legal obstacles are 
removed. Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard told Brisbane radio station 4BC 
on 18 May that Australia would not budge 
on the immunity issue and ‘It may well be 
that the only solution to the problem is an 
amendment to the PNG constitution’
(Howard 2005). Australian lawyers were 
involved in drafting both the ECP 
Agreement and the ECP Act that went 
through the PNG Parliament, and advice 
from the PNG State Solicitor’s Office that 
the immunity was unconstitutional was ‘not 
considered or accepted’ (Post Courier 
2005a).
The legal technicalities are now being 
reconsidered—Alexander Downer and PNG’s Foreign 
Minister Sir Rabbie Namaliu want some closure to the 
issue before the 30* anniversary of independence in 
September. As Sir Rabbie noted ‘We both know that we 
are coming from two positions— that we obviously need 
to move gradually so that we can arrive at a common 
position. But if it’s seen to be done is a spirit of 
brinkmanship, then that’s where problems start’ (Post 
Courier 2005c).
Australia would do well to heed his advice. PNG 
may in fact need to change its constitution to allow not 
only ECP personnel but also diplomats to enjoy immunity, 
but to say so openly is to draw Australia into unproductive 
quarrels with PNG over the level of Australian 
intervention in PNG’s national affairs. It is also indicative 
of a failure to understand the real issue at stake with the 
ECP is PNG’s sovereignty, not Australia’s security.
Conclusion
PNG politicians are not actually against Australian 
assistance. Even the Governor of Morobe Province, 
Luther Wenge, who took the matter to the Supreme Court,
now wants Australia to help in creating a new prograqjme 
to assist PNG (The National 2005a). The question for 
Australia remains how to achieve what it wants in PNG 
without looking like it is intervening; to date this has 
proved impossible.
The problem for Australia is that PNG is a 
sovereign state and still has a sovereign government with 
sovereign institutions. The ECP is not a humanitarian 
intervention and the ECP police personnel are not 
peacekeepers. Australian assistance is welcome if it is 
offered in an appropriate way. Australia can help PNG 
work effectively if it pursues less abrasive methods. PNG 
may be on the ropes but it can still throw a few uppercuts 
to defend itself. If  it wants effective cooperation with its 
nearest neighbour, Australia needs to treat PNG as a 
sovereign state, not as a collapsed state, and to give it 
the respect it deserves.
Endnotes
1 In 1906 the Australian Commonwealth 
took responsibility for the Australian 
Territory of Papua, the former British 
Protectorate of New Guinea. The 
settlement of World War I permitted 
Australia to extend its rule over the former 
German colony of New Guinea, which at 
that time comprised the rest of eastern half 
of the mainland of New Guinea as well as 
the Islands of the Bismarck Archipelago. 
After the Pacific War, the New Guinea 
section was administered as a United 
Nations Trust Territory and the Papua part 
as an Australian Territory.
2 Downer’s view is not shared by all commentators. Tim 
Anderson (2003a) in a letter to The National argued 
this was not neo-colonialism but re-colonisation. Anderson 
is also the author (2003b) of the report A Grand Deceit: 
The World Bank’s Claims O f Good Governance In 
Papua New Guinea, which is highly critical of the gap 
between the rhetoric of ‘good governance’ and the actual 
effects of privatisation polices.
3 Initially, the agreement was sometimes referred to by 
government and media as a ‘package’, sometimes as a 
‘programme’ or sometimes as ‘the enhanced 
agreement’. Governmental terminology has now settled 
on “Enhanced Cooperation Program”.
4. This term ‘partnership’ was used widely by the former 
Minister for Territories, Sir Paul Hasluck, in the 1950s 
and 1960s when describing the nature of Australia’s 
relationship with Papua New Guinea.
3 The deployments to Mt Hagen, Lae and the Highlands 
Highway had not yet taken place.
6 There is some dispute as to the number of judges on 
the panel. The National (2005 a) claims there were three. 
The Post Courier (2005b) cites the Head of the Institute
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